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 
Abstract--As compared to load demand, frequent wind energy 
intermittencies produce large short-term (sub 1-hr to 3-hr) 
deficits (and surpluses) in the energy supply.  These intermittent 
deficits pose systemic and structural risks that will likely lead to 
energy deficits that have significant reliability implications for 
energy system operators and consumers.  This work provides a 
toolset to help policy makers quantify these first-order risks.  The 
thinking methodology / framework shows that increasing wind 
energy penetration significantly increases the risk of loss in 
California.  In addition, the work presents holistic risk tables as a 
general innovation to help decision makers quickly grasp the full 
impact of risk. 
 
Index Terms--California, renewable energy, risk analysis, 
systems engineering, wind power generation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
HIS work is presented as a companion to our paper 
submitted for publication [1].  Two important outputs in 
that report are: (1) If the components in California’s 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) grow at current rates, 
wind energy will constitute 15% of the state’s energy 
generation by 2016;1 (2) The state has energy reserve capacity 
between 2 and 5 GWh (5 to 10% of total 2009 energy 
demand) consisting of spinning (and other) reserves.  For the 
wind component of the RPS (wRPS) greater than 5%, the 
current reserve capacity is too low and not correctly 
configured to mitigate the risks associated with wind 
intermittency. 
The random, frequent (hour-to-hour) and large changes in 
wind energy output create deficits (and surpluses) (Fig. 1) that 
impose new stresses and risks for the stability of the electric 
grid infrastructure.  Without utility-scale energy storage assets, 
the nature of these risks is significantly different from other 
conventional energy sources like fossil fuels. 
Wind energy intermittencies create systemic and structural 
risks.  In this context, “systemic risk” defines risk that is tied 
to the hour-to-hour operation of the energy grid.  This type of 
risk affects the entire grid or major segments of it on a 
dynamic basis.  Structural risk is that associated with chronic 
shortfalls due to insufficient energy generation.  This is a 
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strategic planning problem that may stem from current use of 
simplistic macro-exchange equations in which annualized 
average energy from wRPS sources is made equivalent to 
energy produced from other non-renewable sources.  Since the 
state does not plan to install redundant non-renewable 
generating equipment to compensate for the intermittencies of 
wind energy, the systemic / structural risks will rise as the 
fraction of wRPS increases.  In this scenario, beyond about 
5% wind penetration [1] the state may experience risks leading 
to losses of tens of billions of dollars. 
In this work, the focus of wind energy risk planning is 
energy stability—not safety, as is more common in nuclear 
energy.  Under normal conditions (i.e., no storm or excessive 
load demand), it is not possible to forecast wind energy output 
with a high degree of confidence.  As shown with the 
application of the hour-to-hour auto-correlation function 
(hhACF) in [1], wind energy has large short-term predictive 
uncertainty.  These, coupled with the fact that wind energy 
generation may fall to zero, are the basic factors of energy 
instability represented by wind. 
This work provides a toolset for policy makers struggling to 
make the right energy policy choices that will have profound 
multi-decades impact.  In our view, proactive RPS energy 
policy choices must be balanced with appropriate 
understanding and mitigation of systemic and structural risk.  
The consequence of inadequate risk strategies possibly 
exposes the state to energy deficit crises in 6 to 10 years. 
Why should Californians take this seriously?  There is 
precedence of energy instability in our recent past; in the 
Risk Quantification Associated with Wind 
Energy Intermittency in California 
Sam O. George, Member, IEEE, H. Bola George, Ph.D. and Scott V. Nguyen, Ph.D. 
T
 
Fig. 1: wRPS = 15% energy production and load demand profiles vs. hour 
for a scenario containing 15 contiguous days.  No energy is produced when 
wind speed falls below 4 m/s or exceeds 25 m/s.  In this case, no energy is 
produced in 26 (7.22%) out of 360 hours.  
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structural energy crises of 2000-2001, it is estimated that 
California lost $40 to $45 billion (about 3.5% of Gross State 
Product (GSP)) [2].  During this period, the state experienced 
rolling blackouts (load shedding) over 38 days [3] as energy 
demand exceeded supply by an average of 600 MW.  In some 
cases, electricity customers lost power for up to 16 hours.2  
Again, as cited in [1], notable recent precedents exist in 
Denmark and Texas. 
A note about reading this document: The purpose is to 
provide an analytics framework for energy risk quantification.  
Of course, it is possible that businesses and government will 
not stand by and allow wRPS risks to become chronic.  The 
reality is that we are operating under mandates codified in 
California law (CA AB 32 / Governor’s executive order) to 
achieve 33% RPS (RPS33) by 2030.  The logical action is that 
risk mitigation infrastructure will be added to cope with the 
inherent intermittencies of wind energy.  One essential 
component of risk mitigation infrastructure may include 
utility-scale storage.  
II.  WIND ENERGY RISK ANALYTICS 
A.  The Faulty Energy-Exchange Macro Equation 
Without significant utility-scale storage, wind energy 
should not be equated with energy from conventional sources 
(e.g., fossil-based).  The underlying risk is that wind energy 
has large random short-term (sub 1-hr to 3-hr) intermittencies, 
as shown in Fig. 1, that necessitate constant compensation [1].  
The energy-exchange macro equations equate the statistical 
average energy from wRPS generator sites to the absolute 
energy produced from conventional sources.  Moreover, the 
statistical averages are often derived from data measured in 
annual terms.  This type of averaging masks the short-term 
intermittencies that are important for grid stability.  So, 
effectively, there are two or more3 levels of averaging that 
lead to a faulty outcome. 
Wind energy dispatch is a real-time scheduling problem.  1 
GWh of energy from a fossil fired plant  1 GWh of energy 
from any wind farm (or collection of wind farms).  To make 
the macro energy-exchange equation “work” today, California 
relies on interruptible power agreements with large energy 
consumers [4]—this so-called demand-side compensation, is 
another major element of risk.  As shown by the precedence of 
California’s 2000-2001 energy crises, large businesses that use 
these interruptible power contracts are much less tolerant of 
blackouts.  During the energy crises, as exemplified by Fruit 
Growers Supply Co., a number of companies either sought to 
extricate themselves from these contracts [5] (see Section II-
G) or chose to keep power flowing at expensive premium 
rates.  If we use precedence as a guide, then the reliance on 
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interruptible power contracts poses a serious risk to grid 
stability.   
B.  Definition of Risk as used in this work 
Formally, risk, R$, is the product of two components: (The 
probability of an Energy Deficit, PEDeficit)  (The Impact of 
Energy Deficits, IEDeficit). 
R$ = PEDeficit  IEDeficit (1) 
  
It is our goal to present solutions that comply with equation 
(1).  When not possible, we will use a set of heuristics that 
follow the spirit of the equation.   
C.  Definition of Energy Deficit 
Measured on a short-term basis (sub 1-hr to 3-hr), energy 
deficit (EDeficit) is the difference between demand load 
(EDemand) and wRPS generation output (EwRPS) + some reserve 
capacity (EResCap). 
EDeficit = EDemand - EwRPS + EResCap (2) 
We assume that the 2 to 5 GWh spinning, and other, 
reserves can produce the fast response [1] required to 
compensate for the short-term intermittencies in wind energy 
output.  Implicit in this assumption is the requirement that the 
fast compensation reserves must have non-stochastic real-time 
stability as compared to EwRPS output. 
D.  Risk Factors 
While we restrict our discussion to the first-order risk 
associated with energy deficits, it is important to note that the 
dynamics of wRPS integration create a number of additional 
and significant risk factors.  Table 1 presents a partial 
summary of risk factors that are considered in the context of 
this work. 
E.  Probability of n-hr Deficit Clusters 
wRPS profiles, such as in Fig. 1, contain n-hr “natural” 
clusters of energy deficit, i.e., contiguous hour-to-hour 
deficits.  The cluster lengths may be one or multiple hours 
long.  For example, from Fig. 1, the “natural” formation 
produces clusters ranging in length from 1 hour to 15 hours.  
While natural clusters are good for description of the 
experimental data, they pose a challenge for forming reliable 
probability metrics.  Specifically, it is difficult to talk 
systematically about the probability of “naturally” formed 
clusters of different sizes. 
In the models for this work, we use “synthetic” clustering.  
We use two different counting methods that bound the range 
of probabilities of synthetic n-hr cluster sizes.  These synthetic 
clusters are deliberate constructs to ensure that the probability 
computations yield consistent results. 
Application of these probability counting methods 
(described in Section II-F) produces probabilities for synthetic 
n-hr windows; i.e., 1 hr, 2 hr, 3 hr, ... etc.  The important point 
is that the probabilities associated with the synthetic n-hr 
clusters exist orthogonally; i.e., they can all be combined in 
the same space without affecting the accuracy of the overall 
probability estimate.  The orthogonal properties allow 
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application of different cost impact factors as discussed in 
Section II-G. 
Fig. 2 presents a sample application of the synthetic deficit 
cluster probability algorithm (SDCPA) described in Section II-
F.  In this example, we utilize the wind energy generation 
scenario shown in Fig. 1 as the basis.  The reserve capacity of 
5 GWh is assumed to be readily dispatchable to compensate 
for any / all wind intermittencies. 
F.  Synthetic deficit cluster probability algorithm (SDCPA) 
This section presents the synthetic deficit cluster probability 
algorithm (SDCPA).  The algorithm is presented in pseudo-
code for simplicity.  The SDCPA uses two methods to 
calculate the probability of energy deficit clusters.  Method 0 
counts all non-overlapping n-hr synthetic energy deficit 
clusters.  This method produces a slight undercounting as 
cluster sizes increase.  Method 1 counts overlapping n-hr 
synthetic clusters.  This method produces a slight over-count.  
The SDCPA is implemented as follows: 
 
//Let ... 
eDemand = vector  energy demand profile by hour 
ewRPS = vector  wRPS energy production profile by 
hour 
eDeficit = vector  containing energy deficits 
v = vector  binary thresholds 
c0   representing clusters (method 0) 
c1 = vector  representing clusters (method 1) 
EResCap = scalar  total reserve capacity in grid 
N = scalar  number of hours in eDemand and ewRPS 
profiles 
h = scalar  subscript for hour 
i = scalar  subscript for clusters 
n0 = vector  Total number of clusters and non-
clusters; method 0 
n1 = vector  Total number of clusters and non-
clusters; method 1 
p0 = vector  probability of clusters; method 0 
p1 = vector  probability of clusters, method 1 
 
//Create deficit vector ... 
For (h = 1 to N, h++) { 
eDeficit[h] = (eDemand[h] – ewRPS[h] – EResCap)   
[(eDemand[h] – ewRPS[h]) ≥ 0]; 
v[h] = eDeficit[h] > 0;  // v[h] is a 1D vector of 0’s or 1’s 
} 
 
// Create cluster vectors (method 0 and method 1) ... 
For (i = 1 to 23; i++) {  // step size is always 1 
 For (h = i to N; h++) { 
r = h – i +1; 
ࢉ଴ሾ݅ሿ ൅ൌ  ෑ࢜ሾ݆ሿ
௛
௝ୀ௥
; 
n0[i]++; 
} 
m = 0; 
For (h = i to N; h + m) { // step size is 1 or i 
q = h – i +1; 
ࢉଵሾ݅ሿ ൅ൌ  ෑ࢜ሾjሿ
௛
௝ୀ௤
; 
݉  ൌ  ݅ ൈෑ࢜ሾjሿ
௛
௝ୀ௤
; 
if (m == 0, m = 1) 
n1[i]++; 
} 
 
// Calculate probabilities ... 
Table 1: wRPS Risk Factors Matrix 
Risk 
Factor 
Primary Risk Factors Notes 
1 Large-magnitude hour-to-hour 
intermittencies in wind energy 
generation capacity. 
With the state’s current reserve capacity and beyond 5% wind penetration [1], the large 
intermittencies of wind energy may lead to deficits of unpredictable magnitude and 
duration.  
2 Rate of change of wind energy 
generation output. 
Large hour-to-hour changes in wind energy generation create ramp-rate problems.  
Because it is difficult to predict the short-term output of wind farms in the grid, it may not 
be possible to deliver compensation energy to grid-segments when required.  The ramp-
rate problem requires fast-response generators to compensate for sudden changes in wind 
energy output.  From Fig. 1, there are several instances in which the hour-to-hour wind 
energy output varies by more than 10 GW.  For example, a 10 GW deficit requires the fast 
compensation generators to produce a sustained ~167 MW/min.  Ramp-rates of this order 
are difficult to sustain with the mix of generating assets currently deployed in California.  
In our estimate, such a ramp rate requires tens of fast compensation generators. 
3 Random periods of wind energy 
deficits and surpluses. 
Random intervals between wind 
energy deficits / surpluses. 
The length of time associated with wind energy deficits (or surpluses) is random.  This 
produces large-scale planning uncertainty for grid operators.  If these deficits translate to 
blackouts, the effects on the economy would magnify non-linearly.  For example, the grid 
operators may need to maintain compensation generators in sub-optimal standby mode for 
many more hours than required.  This practice constitutes a large loss of revenue. 
4 Transmission constraints. Compensating for wind energy deficits is constrained by the transmission infrastructure.  
Even if all the compensating generation capacity is dispatchable, there is a real possibility 
that the energy may not get to the clients because of transmission bottlenecks. 
5. Rate of Implementation of 
wRPS. 
Evolution of the current grid follows an innovation trajectory spanning 100 to 150 years.  
Most utility-scale wRPS implementation experience is less than 20 year.  The lack of field 
and technical experience / data constitutes an element of risk. 
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Fig. 4: Summation of total number of hours corresponding to each n-hr 
cluster of energy deficits vs. n-hr clusters.  The reserve capacity is 5 
GWh.  
࢖଴ሾ݅ሿ ൌ   ࢉ଴ሾ݅ሿ࢔଴ሾ݅ሿ ; 
 
࢖ଵሾ݅ሿ ൌ   ࢉଵ
ሾ݅ሿ
࢔ଵሾ݅ሿ ; ሽ 
G.  Impact of n-hr Wind Energy Deficits 
The second component of risk (eq. 1) is the dollar-impact 
(IEDeficit) associated with n-hr energy deficits.  Impact is the 
product of the normalized loss-per-hour (Lhr) and the total 
number of hours in the corresponding n-hr deficit clusters (Nn-
hr). 
IEDeficit = Lhr  Nn-hr (3) 
Growth in the fraction of energy from wRPS means that 
most of California’s highly interconnected economy will be 
adversely affected by energy deficits resulting from wind 
intermittencies.  Thus we calibrate Lhr based on broad 
application of the sector customer damage functions (SCDF) 
developed in [6].  Lhr is based on the weighted average cost of 
1-hour energy interruption for all sectors of the economy.  Lhr 
uses a loss basis of $8.76 / kWh in 1996 dollars for the entire 
United States.  In this work, our illustrations are computed 
with the 1996 loss basis of $8.76 / kWh.4  As noted in [6][7], 
the economic losses associated with multi-hour deficits is non-
linear, in that the “interruption costs increase with duration in 
a non-linear manner.”  Further, the random and large 
intermittencies of wRPS generation complicate the 
calculations.  To simplify our models, we apply the 1-hour 
loss-basis linearly across all clusters of deficits.  Thus, the cost 
of larger deficit clusters are underestimates. 
Let us posit that California’s Gross State Product (GSP) is 
at parity when there is energy stability; i.e., demand is equal to 
generation on an hour-to-hour basis.  Parity means that the 
grid, based on data for the entire United States, can supply, 
                                                          
4 If we correct for inflation and other economic factors, the loss-basis is about 
$16.08 / kWh in 2009 dollars.  The estimates in [6] represent a comprehensive 
loss basis from which other estimates can easily be drawn. 
100% energy with a reliability of 99.96% (corresponding to 
the highest reliability of 3.5 hours of blackouts per year) [6]. 
Using Lhr and the SDCPA in Section II-F, the model 
computes the 1-hour dollar-impact as shown in Fig. 3. 
For example, Fig. 3 shows Lhr at four wRPS penetration 
levels vs. synthetic cluster sizes based on a reserve capacity of 
5 GWh.  At wRPS = 15%, the Lhr hour ranges from $21.38 
million to $43.32 million/hr. 
From application of the synthetic deficit cluster probability 
algorithm in Section II-F, we obtain the total number of hours 
corresponding to each n-hr cluster shown in Fig. 4. 
For perspective, it is useful to review the dollar-impact of 
energy deficits during the 2000-2001 energy crises on one 
California farming operation [5][8].  As shown, losses mount 
and multiply quickly during multi-hour blackouts.  As further 
illustrated in [7], the losses are often under-reported.  
Businesses generally have low tolerance for blackouts—they 
quickly begin to invest in blackout mitigation equipment (e.g., 
backup generators).  These investments are non-incremental 
business-continuity insurance expenditures that, in addition to 
maintenance, represent loss of profit.  The experience of the 
 
Fig. 2: Probability of energy deficits at different wRPS penetration levels 
with 5 GWh reserve capacity vs. n-hr deficit clusters in both overlap (red 
curve) and non-overlap (blue) formulations.  
 
Fig. 3: Dollar-impact (Lhr) of energy deficits at different wRPS 
penetration levels with 5 GWh reserve capacity vs. n-hr deficit-clusters.  
Lhr is based on a loss-basis of $8.76 / kWh.  
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Fig. 6: Energy-supply reliability vs. wRPS penetration levels for the 
generation / demand profiles shown in Fig. 1.  At wRPS = 15% and 
reserve capacity = 5 GWh, the reliability drops to 70.83%.  
Land O’Lakes cooperative also illustrates that reliance on 
interruptible power contracts is not workable if the energy 
deficits become frequent.  Thus, the fact that large businesses 
sign up for interruptible power programs should not be 
regarded as an indication of high risk tolerance.  Rather, it is 
an exercise in business operating-cost minimization because 
these programs offer significant discounts for participation.  
H.  Risk Associated with Energy Deficits 
As defined in eq. 1 (Section II-B), the annualized Risk is 
the product of the probability of deficits (Section II-E) and the 
dollar-impact of these deficits (Section II-G).  Building on the 
examples in these sections, we present Fig. 5—a view of the 
risk associated with synthetic clusters of energy deficits.  Fig. 
5 shows how risk grows with increasing wRPS penetration. 
To present a holistic view of risk, we show two snapshots 
of risk tables in Section II-J. 
I.  How wRPS intermittency reduces Reliability 
To the first order, the risk posed by wRPS intermittencies 
changes California’s reliability expectations significantly.  
Reliability is one minus the probability of energy deficits.  At 
wRPS = 15% and reserve capacity of 5 GWh, California’s 
energy generation reliability may drop to 70.83%.  This, as 
compared to nominal baseline performance of 99.96%, 
represents many hundred hours of energy deficits.  Fig. 6 
presents the reliability profile vs. wRPS penetration levels for 
the generation / demand profiles in Fig. 1 for 1-hour deficits.  
Beyond the first order, there are higher order risks associated 
with the frequency of energy deficits; i.e., in the wRPS 
scenario, the deficits occur more frequently and randomly.  
The associated loss of such instability is largely unknown, but 
potentially as large as the first order risk presented in this 
work. 
J.  Risk Tables—A classical view 
To present a comprehensive view of risk, this section 
utilizes a classical method similar to that from the actuarial 
sciences.  The underlying equations are generally unwieldy—
thus the tabular format is more accessible.  In this section we 
present two examples in Table 2 (wRPS = 6%) and Table 3 
(wRPS = 15%).  From Table 2, California’s grid can ‘sustain’ 
wRPS = 6% with 5 GWh reserve capacity to produce 
associated risk between 0 and $1 billion.  In contrast, Table 3 
shows that the risk associated with wRPS=15% exceeds $50 
billion at a reserve capacity of 5 GWh (10% of peak demand).  
The risk profile is much less for a reserve capacity of 10 GWh 
(20% of peak demand)—but as discussed in Section III, 
California has to re-evaluate the opportunity cost of wRPS vs. 
deployment of 10 GWh reserve capacity. 
III.  Conclusion / Solutions 
In addition to the conclusions in [1], this work shows how / 
why risk quantification analytics methodology should be 
included in California’s wind RPS strategy.  The risk tables in 
this work provide a holistic insight into the probable losses 
associated with various wRPS penetration levels and reserve 
capacities.  The loss-basis shown is conservative.  This is 
further calibrated against estimated losses from California’s 
2000-2001 energy crises.  Using this loss-basis, we estimate 
that California’s risk exposure in a wRPS = 15% scenario 
could exceed tens of billions per year in 2009 dollars. 
There is no easy way out—at high wRPS penetration levels 
(e.g., 15%) a significant fraction of the state’s GSP [9] will be 
lost directly from wRPS intermittency.  If not directly, the loss 
in GSP will be felt indirectly as non-incremental expenditures 
are diverted to wRPS intermittency risk mitigation. 
 
Fig. 5: Conservative annualized risk vs. n-hr deficit cluster sizes for the 
state of California at various wRPS penetration levels.  The reserve 
capacity is 5 GWh.  
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With a holistic view of risk, the state needs to re-evaluate 
the opportunity costs associated with wRPS implementation.  
For example, one way to achieve wRPS = 15% is to invest in 
appropriate fast-response energy reserve capacity (such as 
combined-cycle gas-fired plants) or utility-scale storage assets 
[1]. 
The state must also re-examine whether reliance on 
interruptible power contracts as a means for maintaining grid 
stability is workable in the wRPS = 15% scenario.  With the 
precedence of the 2000-2001 crises coupled with these large 
risks, it is our view that interruptible power contracts are not 
workable as wRPS energy deficits increase in frequency, 
randomness and length. 
  
Table 2: Annualized Risk (in 2009 dollars) at various wRPS = 6% penetration vs. n-hr energy deficit clusters 
(The reserve capacities are 2 and 5 GWh)
  Method 1: Non-overlap method Method 0: Overlap Method 
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6 2 1 29.2 2556.8 68.36 8.55 21.860 29.2 2556.8 119.94 10.144 25.934 
6 2 2 15.0 1316.3 65.94 9.149 12.043 25.3 2222 117.68 10.146 22.544 
6 2 3 9.6 841.8 64.81 9.592 8.074 22.1 1934.4 117.54 10.334 19.990 
6 2 4 7.1 619.8 62.26 9.872 6.119 19 1669.7 117.54 10.334 17.255 
6 2 5 5.4 473.8 61.79 9.976 4.727 16 1403.5 117.54 10.334 14.504 
6 2 6 3.6 316.2 58.73 10.865 3.435 13 1135.9 113.67 11.092 12.599 
6 2 7 3.3 292.2 59.27 10.742 3.139 10.5 916.2 113.67 11.092 10.163 
6 2 8 2.6 230.7 45.5 10.101 2.330 7.9 695.3 109.13 11.537 8.022 
6 2 9 1.9 168.6 44.7 11.026 1.859 5.7 498.1 96.34 12.581 6.266 
6 2 10 1.2 108.2 47.21 13.975 1.512 4 349.6 79.96 14.201 4.965 
6 2 11 1.3 109.6 49.4 13.293 1.457 2.9 250.5 79.96 14.201 3.557 
6 2 12 0.6 51.9 42.64 15.778 0.818 1.7 150.7 44.98 14.266 2.150 
6 2 13 0.6 52.2 43.85 14.977 0.781 1.1 100.8 44.98 14.266 1.437 
6 2 14 0.3 25.3 28.37 17.993 0.455 0.6 50.5 28.6 16.93 0.855 
6 2 15 0.3 25.3 28.6 16.93 0.429 0.3 25.3 28.6 16.93 0.429 
6 5 1 3.6 316.6 5.09 4.111 1.301 3.6 316.6 5.88 4.017 1.272 
6 5 2 1.1 98.5 4.12 4.576 0.451 2.2 195.3 4.69 4.166 0.814 
6 5 3 0.8 74.3 4.64 4.577 0.340 1.7 146.9 4.69 4.166 0.612 
6 5 4 0.3 24.6 2.45 5.44 0.134 1.1 98.2 3.59 4.559 0.448 
6 5 5 0.3 24.6 3.14 5.579 0.137 0.8 73.9 3.59 4.559 0.337 
6 5 6 0.3 24.7 3.54 5.242 0.129 0.6 49.4 3.59 4.559 0.225 
6 5 7 0.3 24.8 3.59 4.559 0.113 0.3 24.8 3.59 4.559 0.113 
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Table 3: Annualized Risk (in 2009 dollars) at various wRPS = 15% penetration vs. n-hr energy deficit clusters 
(The reserve capacities are 2, 5 and 10 GWh)
  Method 1: Non-overlap method Method 0: Overlap Method 
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15 2 1 49.7 4358.6 440.48 35.239 153.593 49.7 4358.6 737.87 36.605 159.547 
15 2 2 31.4 2751.4 435.32 36.469 100.339 45.1 3955.7 736.91 36.971 146.244 
15 2 3 21.4 1878.4 415.43 37.263 69.996 41.1 3599.4 731.49 37.118 133.605 
15 2 4 16.0 1406.9 394.08 38.037 53.514 37.3 3265.8 731.49 37.118 121.219 
15 2 5 13.1 1151.5 404.58 37.817 43.545 33.4 2930.2 731.49 37.118 108.764 
15 2 6 9.4 822.9 366.17 38.709 31.855 29.6 2592.8 727.22 37.986 98.490 
15 2 7 7.7 677.0 383.82 40.575 27.471 26 2278.2 727.22 37.986 86.539 
15 2 8 6.5 565.5 331.61 40.898 23.130 22.4 1961.8 715.81 38.996 76.503 
15 2 9 5.1 445.1 315.56 38.919 17.325 19 1668.5 715.81 38.996 65.066 
15 2 10 4.8 417.4 321.22 40.749 17.010 15.7 1373.6 715.81 38.996 53.565 
15 2 11 4.4 385.7 321.89 43.309 16.704 12.3 1077 686.18 39.825 42.891 
15 2 12 3.4 302.3 304.32 45.039 13.614 9.2 803.8 600.33 40.694 32.708 
15 2 13 2.1 182.6 295.15 50.402 9.205 6.6 579.4 498.3 46.578 26.986 
15 2 14 2.1 186.5 312.96 49.627 9.256 4.9 429.5 498.3 46.578 20.003 
15 2 15 1.7 151.1 273.8 54.029 8.166 3.2 278.7 452.82 49.643 13.835 
15 2 16 1.3 116.9 201.79 55.997 6.545 1.7 152.5 378.19 50.884 7.757 
15 2 17 0.3 25.5 85.1 44.451 1.133 0.6 51 87.56 43.194 2.201 
15 2 18 0.3 25.6 87.56 43.194 1.104 0.3 25.6 87.56 43.194 1.104 
15 5 1 29.2 2556.8 170.91 21.375 54.651 29.2 2556.8 299.85 25.359 64.836 
15 5 2 15.0 1316.3 164.85 22.874 30.109 25.3 2222 294.2 25.364 56.359 
15 5 3 9.6 841.8 162.03 23.981 20.186 22.1 1934.4 293.84 25.835 49.974 
15 5 4 7.1 619.8 155.65 24.681 15.298 19 1669.7 293.84 25.835 43.136 
15 5 5 5.4 473.8 154.48 24.941 11.818 16 1403.5 293.84 25.835 36.260 
15 5 6 3.6 316.2 146.83 27.163 8.588 13 1135.9 284.18 27.731 31.498 
15 5 7 3.3 292.2 148.18 26.855 7.847 10.5 916.2 284.18 27.731 25.407 
15 5 8 2.6 230.7 113.75 25.252 5.825 7.9 695.3 272.83 28.842 20.054 
15 5 9 1.9 168.6 111.75 27.566 4.647 5.7 498.1 240.86 31.453 15.666 
15 5 10 1.2 108.2 118.03 34.937 3.781 4 349.6 199.9 35.503 12.413 
15 5 11 1.3 109.6 123.5 33.233 3.642 2.9 250.5 199.9 35.503 8.892 
15 5 12 0.6 51.9 106.61 39.445 2.046 1.7 150.7 112.46 35.664 5.375 
15 5 13 0.6 52.2 109.63 37.442 1.954 1.1 100.8 112.46 35.664 3.593 
15 5 14 0.3 25.3 70.92 44.982 1.136 0.6 50.5 71.49 42.325 2.138 
15 5 15 0.3 25.3 71.49 42.325 1.072 0.3 25.3 71.49 42.325 1.072 
15 10 1 5.3 462.6 51.42 26.862 12.428 5.3 462.6 58.4 27.294 12.627 
15 10 2 2.0 173.8 42.81 27.152 4.720 3.6 317.4 47.92 26.597 8.443 
15 10 3 1.4 125.2 45.29 26.813 3.358 2.8 244.9 47.92 26.597 6.513 
15 10 4 0.6 49.5 24.67 27.387 1.356 2 171.9 42.33 28.912 4.969 
15 10 5 0.6 49.8 32.4 28.773 1.433 1.4 123.1 42.33 28.912 3.560 
15 10 6 0.6 50.1 39.7 29.374 1.471 0.8 74.1 42.33 28.912 2.142 
15 10 7 0.3 24.8 26.48 33.598 0.832 0.3 24.8 26.48 33.598 0.832 
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